Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14 by Kathleen McGarry
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 14
Volume Author/Editor: James M. Poterba, editor
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-66164-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/pote00-2
Publication Date: January 2000
Chapter Title: Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests? Estate Taxes and
the Timing of Parental Giving
Chapter Author: Kathleen McGarry
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10848
Chapter pages in book: (p. 93 - 122)Inter Vivos Transfers or
Bequests? Estate Taxes and the
Timing of Parental Giving
Kathleen McGarry
University of California, Los Angeles and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The estates of individuals who die with wealth over specified levels are
taxed at high marginal rates. In 1999 the marginal tax rates ranged from
37 percent on estates of $650,000 to 55 percent on estates of over $3
million. Because children are the most frequent heirs, one would expect
other gift-giving behavior to children to be affected by the potential tax
rates faced by the estate. However, surprisingly little is known about
this relationship. This paper investigates the link between estate taxes
and inter vivos transfers from parents to children. I find that the exis-
tence of estate taxes hastens the transfer of resources from parents to
children. Those parents whose estates are likely to be subject to tax make
greater inter vivos gifts to their children and these gifts increase with the
marginal tax rate. I estimate that if estate taxes were eliminated, inter
vivos transfers from parents to children would be reduced by nearly 30
percent per year. Despite these findings, there is also strong evidence
that parents fail to take full advantage of opportunities for tax-free giving
and transfer too little to children over their own lifetimes.
I am especially grateful to David Joulfaian for careful reading and helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper and to James Poterba and Michael }-lurd for their valuable
suggestions. This research was funded by the National Institute on Aging through grant
number AG1411O-02.94 McGarry
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent proposals by the United States Congress have once again brought
estate and gift taxes to the forefront in policymaking circles. While estate
taxes affect relatively few decedents, they are the subject of much debate
and have spawned an entire industry devoted to estate planning. De-
spite the public concern and the continued attention of policymakers,
researchers have devoted little attention to the behavioral effects of es-
tate taxes, and almost none to the relationship between these taxes and
inter vivos giving. We have therefore been able to provide little insight
into how these behaviors would change were there to be changes in the
tax laws.
Estate and gift taxes alter the price of transferring resources to others.
The estates of individuals who die with wealth above specified levels
face high marginal tax rates. These taxes increase the cost of transferring
wealth to heirs and may therefore make consumption and charitable
giving more appealing options for the potential donor. Details of the
estate- and gift-tax code also provide strong incentives for gifts to be
made at certain times in the donor's life, and to be made to particular
recipients. These incentives likely affect the well-being of both donors
and recipients and may alter the total amount given over a lifetime.
Finally, while estate and gift taxes obviously provide revenue to the
government, the amount eventually collected from these taxes wifi de-
pend on the responsiveness of individual gift-giving behavior to the
incentives embodied in the tax code.
This paper examines the effects of estate taxes on inter vivos giving,
with the focus on the transfer of resources from parents to children.1 I
find that estate taxes hasten such transfers; higher estate taxes increase
the cost of bequeathing wealth to heirs and thus increase the probability
and amount of inter vivos transfers. Simulations demonstrate that the
elimination of the estate tax would reduce yearly inter vivos transfers
from the wealthy to their children by nearly 30 percent. I also point to
evidence that many wealthy parents fail to take full advantage of oppor-
tunities to make tax-free transfers despite expected marginal tax rates on
eventual estates of over 40 percent. Preliminary analysis of this behavior
suggests that differences in expected length of life and in the desire to
transfer to children may be partially responsible.
The next section outlines the provisions of the tax law, with special
1Estate taxes likely affect other forms of economic behavior, including savings (Gale and
Perozek, 1999), labor supply (Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994), and charitable giving (Boskin,
1976; Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976; Joulfaian, 1991, 1998).Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?95
attention paid to the incentives for inter vivos giving. Section 3 examines
the relationship between giving and the holding of taxable levels of
wealth, while section 4 focuses on the responsiveness of giving to
changes in the marginal tax rate, and simulates changes in behavior in
response to proposed changes in the tax law. Section 5 discusses the
extent to which parents engage in optimal gift-giving behavior, and a
final section concludes.
2. OUTLINE OF ESTATE- AND GIFT-TAX PROVISIONS
The taxing of financial transfers is governed by a complex set of provi-
sions. There are a number of exemptions and special cases embodied in
the law that affect the incentives to give. In this section I first provide an
overview of the general principles involved and then discuss in more
detail those factors that might affect the timing and amount of transfers
to children.
2.1 Main Features of the Tax Law
Transfer taxes have been used at several times in U.S. history as a
temporary revenue raising measure, especially in times of war (see Eller,
1996, for a discussion). The current system was instituted with the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and is based on a unified treatment of inter vivos
gifts and bequests: the taxes owed by an estate are based on the total
amount transferred by an individual, including gifts made during the
decedent's life and those transferred as part of his estate.
There are, however, several important components of the system that
effectively eliminate any such taxes for most individuals and signifi-
cantly reduce the tax owed by others. First, there exists a unified tax
credit that exempts all but the very largest transfers from tax. In 1999 the
unified credit was $211,300, which served to eliminate all taxes on trans-
fers of up to $650,000. Under current law this credit wifi gradually in-
crease to $345,800 in 2006, permitting up to $1 million to be transferred
tax-free.
A second important component of the estate tax is the unlimited mari-
tal deduction. Bequests to a spouse, regardless of the amount, are un-
taxed. By taking advantage of the marital deduction and the unified
credit a couple may currently transfer tax-free a total of $1.3 million, if
each gives $650,000 to nonspouse heirs.
In addition to the unified tax credit and spousal deduction, a limited
amount can be transferred in each year without counting against the
lifetime ($650,000) exemption. The annual exclusion was $3,000 per recipi-96McGarry
Source: IRS (1997, 1999).
(a) Changed to $10 mijlion-$17,184,000 in 1998.
ent in 1977, increased to $10,000 in 1982, and remains therecurrently.
Beginning in 1999 this amount wifi be indexed for inflation.2
This exclusion provides a mechanism whereby wealthy individuals
can spend down their estates, reducing the amountsubject to tax. Be-
cause the $10,000 limit is per donor and per recipient,families can poten-
tially transfer a substantial sum in each year. A married couple with two
children, each of whom is married with two children of his own, can
transfer $160,000 per year to their children's families without incurring
gift taxes or impinging on the lifetime exemption. Extending such giving
for a period of years can result in substantial spend-down.3
Finally, charitable bequests are deducted from the gross estate before
calculating the tax owed. This provision significantly reduces the price of
charitable giving.4
The marginal tax rates applicable to the combined total of inter vivos
transfers and bequests are reported in Table 1. The rates range from 18
percent for transfers of less than $10,000 to 55 percent for transfers over
$3 million. With the current unified deduction, the lowest marginal rate
2After adjusting for inflation the amount of the exclusion will be rounded down to the
nearest $1000, so that the effects of a moderate rate of inflation will not be felt immediately,
nor wifi changes be likely to occur in every year.
I know of no empirical study that has examined the actual patterns of transfers over time
with regard to the potential tax implications.
Studies of the relationship between estate taxes and charitable giving have found a large
response in the amount given to the marginal tax rate faced by the estate,with price
elasticities of demand for charitable bequests of greater than 1.0 in absolute value (Boskin,
1976; Joulfaian, 1991; Auten and Joulfaian, 1996).
TABLE 1
Marginal Estate Tax Rates
Value of estate Tax rate (%) Value of estate Tax rate (%)
0-$10,000 18 500,000-750,000 37
10,000-20,000 20 750,000-1,000,000 39
20,000-40,000 22 1,000,000-1,250,000 41
40,000-60,000 24 1,250,000-1,500,000 43
60,000-80,000 26 1,500,000-2,000,000 45
80,000-100,000 28 2,000,000-2,500,000 49
100,000-150,000 30 2,500,000-3,000,000 53
150,000-250,000 32 3,000,000-10,000,000 55
250,000-500,000 34 10,000,000_21,040,000(a) 60
> 21,040,000 55Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?97
actually faced by an estate is 37 percent. Estates between $10 million and
$21.04 million face a marginal rate of 60 percent, offsetting the lower
rates applied to smaller amounts.5
If wealthy families wish to reduce the number of times dynastic
wealth is taxed, they might choose to make bequests that skip a genera-
tion, transferring resources directly to grandchildren and reducing the
number of times the family fortune is taxed. To limit the ability of the
wealthy to avoid estate taxes in this way, a generation-skipping tax was
implemented in 1977. With this tax, transfers of over a given amount
made directly to grandchildren (or others of that generation) are subject
to an additional tax.6 Currently the exempt amount is $1 million and the
tax rate for amounts above this limit is 55 percent.7 This tax would be
expected to discourage large transfers to subsequent generations, and in
fact, a relatively small fraction of estates are liable for generation-
skipping taxes. Based on data from 1992 decedents, Joulfaian (1998)
reports that less than one-half of one percent of estates filing tax returns
owed generation-skipping taxes.
2.2 Incentives for Inter Vivos Giving
For parents who anticipate bequeathing large sums to their children (or
other heirs), the $10,000 annual exemption provides a strong incentive
for inter vivos giving.8 There are, however, additional features of the tax
law that might also affect the desired timing of gifts. As highlighted in
Poterba (2000b) and Joulfaian (1999), while transfers beyond the $10,000
limit are often preferable to bequests, the optimal strategy depends very
much on the type of asset.
The overall preference for taxable inter vivos giving relative to be-
quests follows in part from the accounting principles used to determine
the tax owed. Taxes on inter vivos gifts are calculated on top of the actual
(net) amount transferred, while taxes on bequests are calculated on the
This interval was changed to $10 million$17,184,000 for those dying in 1998 or later
(Internal Revenue Service, 1999). I report the values for earlier years in Table 1 because
they were the applicable rates in the years to which the data pertain.
6No generation-skipping tax is applied if the parents of the grandchild are deceased so
that the skip in generations is made out of necessity and not as a means of tax avoidance.
This exempt amount wifi be indexed for inflation beginning in 1999, with amount
rounded down to the nearest $10,000.
8Throughout this paper I assume that individuals receive utility from their own consump-
tion and from transfers to heirs, but not from taxes paid to the government. The desire to
give to heirs can come about because the future decedent cares about the well-being of his
heirs (altruism), because he wishes to use the transfer to purchase particular behaviors
from the recipient (exchange), or because he receives utility directly from making the
transfer (warm glow).98McGcirry
entire estate and subtracted from the (gross) amount bequeathed.Con-
sider a parent who is certain to leave an estate that wifi be subject to tax
at a marginal rate of 55 percent. Suppose the parenttransfers an addi-
tional $10,000 as an inter vivos gift; the tax owed is 0.55X$10,000 =
$5,500 which comes out of the parent's other resources.Transferring
$10,000 therefore costs the parent $15,500, for an effective tax rateof
0.35. If the same amount ($10,000 + $5,500) were transferred as abe-
quest and taxed at a rate of 55 percent, the taxed owedwould be 0.55X
$15,500 or $8,525, and the beneficiary would receive $15,500 - $8,525 =
$6,975, considerably less than if the $15,500 amount were used tofi-
nance a gift.
Prior to the indexing of the exempt amount in 1999, inter vivos trans-
fers also had an advantage over bequests in that since they weremade
earlier, a greater real value could be transferred (i.e., $10,000transferred
in 1985 was worth more than $10,000 transferred in 1995). Finally,if
assets grow in real terms, taxable inter vivos giving ispreferred to tax-
able bequests. For example, if the balance of a savings account,valued at
$20,000 in 1985, is transferred in that year, the taxable portion of thegift
is $10,000. If the entire $20,000 is left untouched by the recipient in an
account earning an annual 5-percent real rate of return, itwifi grow to
$24,380 by 1995. If the same amount accumulated interest at the same
rate but were held by the donor and transferred in 1995,the taxable
portion of the gift would be $14,380 and the tax owed would be greater
than that paid with the earlier transfer.
These aspects of the law seem to indicate unambiguously that trans-
fers should be made as early as possible. However, for some assetsthe
advantages are less clear.
The treatment of capital gains differs for inter vivos transfersand
bequests. If assets which have accrued capital gains are transferred at
death, the value of the asset is "stepped up" so that the recipient's basis
for the calculation of future capital gains taxes is the value atthe time of
receipt. No capital gains taxes are paid on the gains accruedduring the
original owner's life. Conversely, if such assets are transferred as inter
vivos gifts, the basis is not stepped up, and the originalowner's basis is
carried over to the recipient. When the asset is eventually sold, the
recipient must pay taxes on all capital gains as calculated from thebasis
of the original owner. This regulation lowers the price of a bequestfor
assets with unrealized capital gains.
Family farms and businesses also benefit taxwise in several important
ways. First, if a farm or business isbequeathed, the value of the real
property contained in the transfer can be based on itsworth as part ofInter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?99
the ongoing concern.9 Thus, a family farm that is potentially more valu-
able in other use is taxable only up to its value as a farm, provided the
heirs continue to operate it as such. Second, taxes owed on the transfer
of a farm or business can be spread out over 14 years, providing addi-
tional tax relief for heirs.1° Finally, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 pro-
vides an additional exemption of up to $675,000 for family businesses
with qualifications similar to the requirements for the special valuation.
These factors lessen the cost of bequests relative to inter vivos transfers.
It is possible to transfer a small number of shares in a business over time
and value them at less than the corresponding fraction of the business's
net worth if they represent minority positions in the concern. The argu-
ments in this case are that an individual actually purchasing a small
block of stock in a closely held business would have little control over
the operation of the concern relative to other stockholders, as well as
difficulty reselling the shares, and the share price would need to be
discounted accordingly. Transferring shares of a family business this
way thus provides an advantage over the use of a bequest wherein the
business would be transferred in its entirety. Likewise, a large block of
stock in a publicly owned firm, transferred at a single point in time (say
at the death of the owner), may be devalued relative to the market price
if it is thought that the share price would suffer were the recipient to sell
the block all at once on the open market. Using this method, the total tax
bifi might be lessened by transferring the stock as a bequest. Cooper
(1979) provides several fascinating examples of individuals who have
used these methods and others to dramatically reduce the tax owed on
transfers.
3. TAXABLE WEALTH AND INTER VIVOS GIVING
These various incentives embodied in the estate and gift tax make it
difficult to predict the best strategy for an individual seeking to maxi-
mize the amount transferred to heirs. However, it is reasonable to pre-
sume that those facing eventual estate taxes would first choose to make
tax-free inter vivos gifts of $10,000, and a significant fraction of this popu-
Among other limitations, the reduction in the value of the estate due to this special
valuation is limited to $750,000. This amount is indexed for inflation beginning in 1999.
10 Payment of tax, but not interest charges, may be deferred entirely for up to 5years, after
which time the total must be paid within ten years. The interest rate charged on taxes owed
is significantly below the market rate of interest. Joulfaian (1999) finds that this deferment
plays a substantial role in increasing the desirability of bequests relative to inter vivos
transfers.100McGilrry
lation would make at least some gifts beyond that level. Moreover, the
propensity to make inter vivos transfers wifi vary with the types of assets
constituting bequeathable wealth.1'
Using data from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), Poterba
(2000b) finds a marked increase, both in the probability of making any
transfer and in the probability of making transfers totaling $10,000 or
more, as wealth crosses the $600,000 threshold (the value of exempt be-
quests in the year to which his data pertain).12 His results are reproduced
in Table 2, along with comparable figures from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) and the Asset and Health Dynamics Study (AHEAD).13 For
those aged 65-74 in the SCF, the probability of making any transfer to a
child increases from 11.5 percent for those with net worth below $600,000
to 29.5 percent for those with net worth in the range $600,000 to $1.2
million. The probability of a transfer of at least $10,000 increases from 1.2
to 9.9 percent with this change in wealth. As shown in the second panel of
Table 2, the HRS and AHEAD data yield higher probabilities of giving
overall, but similar increases with taxable wealth.'4 For those aged 65-74
the probability of any transfer increases from 25.7 to 56.8 percent as one
crosses from nontaxable to taxable levels of wealth, the probabilityof
transferring $10,000 or more increases from 3.0 to 17.9 percent for this
same age group.
Those with bequeathable wealth above and below the taxable limits
obviously differ in respects other than the probability of facing estate
taxes, most notably, in their financial ability to make transfers. To con-
trol for income, wealth, and other factors that may differ across groups,
Because farms and businesses are illiquid, it may be more difficult or costly to make inter
vivos transfers of these assets, and individuals with a large fraction of their portfolios tied
up in such enterprises may be less likely to make such gifts than others with similar
wealth, despite the potential tax advantages of doing so. This issue will be explored in the
empirical work to follow.
12 The SCF is nearly ideal for studying the effect of estate taxes on behavior. In addition to
a nationally representative sample of households, it contains an oversampleof high-
income and high-wealth households. The drawback of these data is that there is little
information on the (potential) recipients.
13 The HRS and AHEAD are nationally representative samples of individuals born in the
years 1931-1941 (HRS), and in 1921 or before (AHEAD). Interviews were conducted in
1992 and 1993, respectively, when respondents were 51-61 years old, or 70 and over. The
surveys ask nearly identical questions and can easily be combined into a single sample.
They contain a great deal of information on the income and assets of the respondents, as
well as unusually detailed information about their children. The limitation of these data is
that the sample sizes in the upper tails of the wealth distribution are small.
14 The MRS and AHEAD specifically ask parents about transfers made to children in the
past year, and by doing so capture many more such gifts than the SCF, which asks a
general question about transfers made to individuals outside the household.TABLE 2
Transfer Probabilities by Age and Wealth: SCF and HRSIAHEAD
Age category
Survey of Consumer Finances
Any transfer
Probability of transfer (%)
Wealth 600,000- 1.2-2.4 > 2.4
<600,000 1.2 million million million
Sources: SCF results from Poberta (200Db); FIRS/AHEAD results, author's calculations. FIRS/AHEAD
samples are limited to families with children.
Definitions of wealth differ slightly across surveys.
55-64 13.1 18.7 27.6 39.0
(1.6) (6.4) (10.1) (10.9)
65-74 11.5 29.5 22.2 44.6
(1.6) (6.9) (10.4) (10.7)
> 74 9.4 11.9 9.2 48.8
(1.9) (8.1) (17.6) (15.7)
>$10,000
55-64 1.7 5.4 8.9 24.2
(0.6) (2.3) (3.4) (4.0)
65-74 1.2 9.9 15.1 36.6
(0.6) (2.5) (3.8) (4.1)
> 74 1.4 9.6 8.7 38.3
(0.7) (3.0) (6.6) (5.9)
Combined HRS/AHEAD surveys
Any transfer
55-64 34.2 51.7 55.9 61.7
(0.8) (2.8) (4.6) (7.7)
65-74 25.7 56.8 42.1 72.7
(0.9) (4.2) (7.6) (13.4)
> 74 21.2 50.7 63.4 85.4
(0.8) (4.6) (9.6) (10.6)
> $10,000
55-64 2.7 17.2 17.8 24.1
(0.3) (2.1) (3.5) (6.8)
65-74 3.0 17.9 7.8 40.7
(0.3) (3.4) (4.4) (15.5)
> 74 2.4 16.5 18.7 36.8
(0.3) (3.6) (8.1) (15.2)102 McGarry
TABLE 3
Probit and Tobit Estimates for the Probability and Amount of
Transfers: HRS/AMEAD
Source: McGarry (2000, Table 3).
Parental characteristics included in the regressions but not shown are: married, number of children
and grandchildren, income, race, schooling, poor health, mean children's incomeand schooling,
variation in children's income and schooling.
Probability estimated with a probit model, amount estimated with a tobit.
Sample size differs across equations due to missing values on the amount.
McGarry (2000) estimates a probit model for the probabilityof giving.
Included in the specification are the income and wealth of the parent,
parental life expectancy, financial status of children, and severalother
variables. The results are reproduced in Table 3. Even with thesecontrol
variables, the indicator of a taxable estate has a sizable effect,predicting
a 20-percentage-point increase ingiving.15 Parents who have longer ex-
pected lives need to finance their own consumption for a greaternumber
of years and, holding income and wealth constant, wifi be lesslikely to
dispose of assets. The estimates of the model support thisidea: The
effect of having a taxable estate is reduced by length of life.An addi-
tional 10 years of life expectancy reduces the probability ofmaking a
transfer by 4 percentage points. Based on these estimates, anindividual
with a taxable estate and 10 years to live has a 16-percentage-point(or 50-
percent) greater probability of making a transfer than someone inthe
same wealth quartile but with an assetlevel below the taxable limit.
' A family is assumed to have a taxable estate if assets are greater than $600,000 per
spouse.
Probabifity Amount
Coeff. SE Deny. Coeff. SE
Household wealth:
Lowest quartile 0.4780.0480.1576687 698
2nd quartile 0.2770.0420.0914100 594
3rd quartile 0.1320.0370.0432109 523
Highest quartile (omitted)-----
Taxable estate 0.6110.186 0.201 90372384
Taxable estate X life
expectancy/lO
0.1220.0460.0401038 583
Life expectancy/lO 0.0150.0130.005 471 194
Business wealth ($10,000s)0.0000.0010.000 20 8.4
Farm wealth ($10,000s) 0.0130.0040.004189 54
Number of observations 11,600 11,422
Mean of dependent variable 0.30 1518Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?103
In addition to affecting the probability of a transfer, the existence ofan
estate tax likely also affects the amount the donor transfers. In the HRS-
AHEAD sample, among those making positive inter vivos transfers,
those with taxable bequeathable wealth transferredan average of $14,828,
while the less wealthy transferred only $5,588 (not shown). The second
pair of columns in Table 3 reports the effect a taxable estate has on the
amount given in a tobit specification. Even when observable characteris-
tics of the potential donor are controlled for, there remains a large and
significant increase in transfers for those with a taxable estate, increasing
the amount of the transfer by over $9,000, and the effect is mitigated by
length of life.'6
The discussion in section 1.2 notes that the composition of the parent's
portfolio wifi affect the price of inter vivos transfers relative to bequests.
The tax treatment of farms decreases the costs associated with their trans-
fer as a bequest, so a substantial fraction of wealth invested ina family
farm ought to reduce the probability of an inter vivos gift. In contrast, the
ability to transfer shares of a business at below-market rates wifi make
inter vivos transfers of such assets more appealing. Assets that contain
significant capital gains wifi benefit from a step up of the basis if trans-
ferred as a bequest, and the holding of a large amount of wealth in such
assets may therefore reduce inter vivos transfers. At the same time, re-
sources held in these various assets may be more or less liquid than
others, affecting the ease with which parents can make transfers.
Poterba (2000b) explores these relationships and finds some evidence
of differences in behavior associated with the types of assets held. The
results, reported in Table 4, indicate that both the probability of making
any gift, and the probability of transferring $10,000 or more per child,
are greater among those with a substantial fraction of their wealth in
financial assets, and lower for those whose wealth is held ina home,
although this latter effect is not significantly different from zero. The
direction of the effect of business wealth differs across equations but is
not significantly different from zero. When examining the potential role
played by unrealized capital gains, Poterba finds that the greater the
basis value of assets relative to their current market value (the smaller
any unrealized gains), the lower the probability of making a transfer,
although the effect is not significantly different from zero. This result is
in contrast to what a tax-minimizing strategy would predict. However,
for transfers above $10,000 (those more likely to be made in the interest
16Despite the controls for financial resources that are used in these regressions, it remains
likely that some portion of the observed increase in transfers for those with taxable estates
is simply a wealth effect. I discuss this possibility further in section 4.1.104 McGarry
TABLE 4
Probit Estimates for the Probability of a Transfer: Survey of
Consumer Finances
> $10,000/child
of estate planning), the direction of the effect is as expected.McGarry
also finds no difference in transfer probabilities with respect to business
wealth, but significantly lower probabilities for those with substantial
farm wealth.
4. RESPONSIVENESS TO TAX RATES
Over time there have been numerous changes in the laws pertaining to
transfer taxes, and patterns of giving have varied in response. Joulfaian
(1998) highlights some of these relationships. Perhaps thestarkest
change illustrated by Joulfaian is that stemming from the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. This act unified the estate and gift taxes, resulting in a
sharp jump in the gift tax beginning in 1977. Potential donors, learning
of this change in 1976, immediately increased their gift giving behavior
to make transfers at the lower rate. Taxes on 1976transfers were due in
1977, and Treasury receipts in 1977 testify to the surge in giving in the
previous year. Prior to 1977, taxes paid on inter vivos gifts consistently
Any Transfer
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Household wealth:
Net worth < 600,000
(omitted category) ---
Net worth 600,000-1.2 mil-
lion
0.270 0.137 0.138 0.233
Net worth 1.2 million-2.4
million
0.287 0.147 0.561 0.277
Net worth> 2.4 million 0.804 0.129 1.257 0.219
Age of younger spouse -0.0003 0.0021 0.009 0.006
Married -0.019 0.073 -0.108 0.210
Wealth share of financial
assets (millions)
0.027 0.012 0.019 0.008
Wealth share in home equity-0.022 0.021 -0.007 0.030
Wealth share in business -0.141 0.176 0.232 0.393
Ratio of basis to market value
of assets
-0.219 0.105 0.192 0.075
Number of Observations 3394 3394
Log likelthood -1348.21 -137.56
Source: Poterba (2000b, Table 9).Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?105
amounted to approximately 8 percent of total transfer taxes collected.
With the tax-induced spike in inter vivos gift giving, the share of
transfer-tax receipts coming from gifts increased to 24 percent in 1977,
along with an increase in total receipts, before falling to 3 percent in the
subsequent year (Joulfaian, 1998, Table 17). Joulfaian also notes similar,
although less dramatic, responses to legislative changes in the 1930s
and 1940s.
One would expect these time-series patterns to be evident incross-
section analyses as well; those facing higher tax rates ought to behave
differently from those facing lower rates. The continual increase in the
likelthood of a transfer with the wealth of the parent observed in Table 2
is consistent with this prediction. In this section I control directly for the
marginal tax rate the estate would face were the parent(s) to dieon the
date the data were collected. I estimate the responsiveness of intervivos
giving to changes in this tax rate and forecast the effecton transfer
behavior of alternative proposals to modify the estate tax.
4.1 Baseline Specification
I examine transfer behavior in two steps. First, I estimate the probability
of making a transfer to at least one child usinga probit specification. In
the second step I select only those parents who madea positive trans-
fer and estimate the amount of the transfer asa function of the same set
of regressors using ordinary least squares (OLS). This two-stepproce-
dure is preferable to a tobit model in that it providesmore flexibility for
the explanatory variables to affect the probability and the amount of the
transfer differentially.
The explanatory variables in these equations include the income,
wealth,17 and life expectancy of the parent (or parent couple),18 and the
In addition to the standard components of net worth, the measure of bequeathable
wealth used here also includes the face value of life insurance policies and the value of
balances in defined-contribution pension plans. It is difficult to know how to incorporate
correctly the value of life insurance. The value of policies owned by the decedent (i.e.,
premiums paid by the decedent) are considered to be part of the estate. However, policies
on the decedent's life held by the beneficiaries (or others) are not included. In these data I
do not know who pays the premiums on the insurance policy. I assume that affirmative
answers to the question "Do you have any life insurance?" indicates a policy he himself
holds. I include the value of all policies held as of the interview date, including both whole
life and term life policies. This assumption implies that the value of bequeathable wealth
used here is likely an upper bound on the taxable amount. The conclusions of thepaper are
not sensitive to this decision.
18Life expectancy is from United States Department of Health and Human Services (1996).
For married couples this is the sum of the life expectancies of the two spouses, since it is
the total number of person-years over which the couple must finance consumption, and
can make estate-reducing transfers, that wifi affect giving.106 McGarry
average age and income of thechildren.19 I use three variables to mea-
sure the effect of estate taxes on inter vivosgiving: a 0-1 indicator of
whether the estate would be subject to tax, the marginal tax rate,and
the interaction of the marginal tax rate with the expected lifespanof the
parent(s). This specification allows for a discontinuity in giving as the
marginal tax rate changes from zero for those with assets belowthe
exempt amount, to 0.37 for those above. I limit mysample to respon-
dents with living children. Table 10 in the appendix reports the sum-
mary statistics for the variablesused in this analysis. With $600,000 per
spouse as an indicator of a taxable estate,4.1 percent of the sample
would be required to file an estate tax return were they to die atthe
interview date.2° Thirty-two percent of the sample made atransfer to at
least one child in the past year.
4.1.1 Probability of a Transfer The estimates of theprobit model are
reported in Table 5. Both the income and wealth of the parent are posi-
tively and significantly related to the probability of making atransfer.
Assessing the impact of estate taxes is complicated and requiresthat
one combine the three relevant termsin the equationthe indicator of a
taxable estate, the marginal tax rate, and the interaction of the tax rate
with life expectancy. For someone with a life expectancyof 5 years and
assets just at the taxable limit (so that the marginal tax rate is0.37), the
effect of the estate tax is to increase the probability of atransfer by 6.4
percentage points (-0.006 + 0.215 X 0.37 - 0.005 X 0.37 X5) relative to
the probability with no tax. This change is equal to 21 percentof the
use logged values of the dollar-denominated variables of income,wealth, average in-
come of children, and value of transfers. For someindividuals in the sample, wealth is zero
or negative. I use a splinelike transformation to deal withthe nonpositive values. I include
a dummy variable indicating zero wealth, andfor negative wealth I use ln(wealth). I
treat income similarly, including a dummy variable that is equal to oneif the respondent
reports zero income. (Negative income is not possible.)
20This sample obviously differs from the population that will eventually ifie estate taxes.
Official estimates place the fraction of the decedent population filing estate tax returns at
2.8 percent (Eller, 1996). Estate tax returns are filed if the gross estate is abovethe limits
even if the estate eventually owes no tax. Only about halfof filers actually do owe taxes.
The FIRS/AHEAD data come from living respondents, so the measure ofbequeathable
wealth used here is only a proxy for the size of the eventual estate. Many individuals are
currently employed and will likely accumulate more wealth over their lifetimes,leaving
estates that are subject to tax. Others will dissave sufficiently, eitherthrough their own
consumption or through tax-free gifts and charitable donations, that they wifiavoid all
estate taxes. One might expect a higher fraction with taxable estates inthese data than
among recent decedents because these cohorts have greaterlifetime income than their
predecessors and ceteris pan bus wifi have a higher probability of dying with estatesvalued







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































average (unweighted) probability.21 Theprobability of a transfer in-
creases further as the marginal tax rateincreases, and the change is
significantly reduced with increasing length of life. For an individual
with the same life expectancy but facing a marginal tax rateof 0.55, the
increase in the probability due to the estate tax alone (and notthe under-
lying increase in wealth) is 9.9 percentage points, or 32.4 percent.
Transfers also depend significantly on the characteristics of the chil-
dren. A higher average income indicates that children are relativelybetter
off financially, and the probability of a transfer is less.Older children are
less likely to be liquidity-constrained than younger children,and, consis-
tent with this observation, the age of the children isnegatively related to
the probability of a transfer (Cox, 1990).
4.1.2 Amount of the Transfer To estimate the effect of taxes onthe
amount of the transfer, I limit the sample to the 3,320families making a
positive transfer; the predicted value is thus the conditional expectation.
The average amount given by these families was $5622. The second setof
columns in Table 5 presents the results of a linear regressionmodel with
the left-side variable being the natural log of the amount.
As was the case for the probability of a transfer, both the incomeand
wealth of the parent are positively related to the expected amount. A10-
percent increase in parental wealth increases the amountof the transfer
by 2 percent, and the effect of an increase in income is similar
One of the drawbacks of the HRSAHEAD data is the smallnumber of
very wealthy persons. By reducing thesample to those who make a
positive transfer, the number facing nonzero marginal tax rates isfurther
limited, and identification of the three tax variables will likely be less
precise than one might desire. Despite this qualification, estate taxes
continue to have some effect. For an individual in the 37-percent tax
bracket with a life expectancy of 5 years, the expected amount ofthe
transfer (conditional on its being positive) is 28 percent higher (-0.077 +
0.986 X 0.37 - 0.004 X 0.37 X 5) due to the estate tax. Again the effect
increases with the tax rate, so that an individual with the samelife
expectancy and facing a marginal tax rate of 0.55has an expected
amount that is 45 percent higher than in the absenceof estate taxes.
4.1.3 Tax Rates and WealthBecause the marginal tax rate facing the
estate is directly related to parental wealth, the twovariables are highly
21The mean of the left-side variable is 0.304. It differs from the proportion making a
transfer as reported above because the regressions are unweighted.
22See McGarry (1999) for a more detailed analysis of the role of the incomeof children.Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?109
collinear. This relationship makes it impossible to separate the effect of
changes in tax rates from nonlinear changes in wealth.23 A portion of the
increased probability and amounts given by those in higher tax brackets
likely stems from increases in wealth not captured by the log specifica-
tion, and the estimate effects are therefore best viewed as upper bounds
on the role of estate taxes in driving behavior.24
4.2 Portfolio Composition
These equations treat all types of assets equally. However, as discussed
earlier, it is likely that the type of assets held by parents affects their gift-
giving behavior. The greater the capital gains tied up in an asset, the less
costly it is to transfer the asset as a bequest, and the special tax treatment
afforded family businesses at death has a similar effect. In contrast, other
tax incentives associated with the transfer of farms or businesses may tilt
the decision towards inter vivos transfers. Finally, issues of liquidity
may make it difficult to transfer portions of family farms, businesses, or
homes during the parent's life, resulting in a greater tendency to bequest
wealth in these forms. In these data I have no way of measuring capital
gains, but I am able to distinguish between wealth held in various
forms.25 To control for these factors I add four variables to the above
specifications: the fraction of wealth in a farm, a business, a home, and
in stocks. The rightmost set of columns in Table 5 report the results.
The greater the fraction of wealth in a farm or a home, the significantly
lower the probability of a transfer, while the greater the fraction of
wealth in stock, the higher the probability. An increase in the fraction of
wealth in a business decreases the probability of a transfer, but the effect
is not significantly different from zero.
In the equation for the amount of the transfer, the effects are of thesame
sign, but only the fraction of wealth held in a home has a significant effect.
The effect of farm wealth is large and negative but is estimatedvery
23Empirically the coefficient estimates for the tax rate and the taxable-estate dummy
variable change noticeably when alternative measures of wealth are used in the regres-
sions. However, the simulated effects of changes in amounts given (reported in Table 6)
are quite similar to those obtained with the log specification.
24One way to attempt to separate the effects is to find alternative sources of variation in tax
rates. Because states can impose their own estate, gift, or inheritance taxes, there exists the
potential to identify the effects. Unfortunately for the analyst, the effect of state taxes in the
vast majority of states is to reduce the revenue going to the federal government with no
additional tax burden placed on the individual estates. In 1999 only four states had estate
taxes that affected the taxes owed by the estate. Page (1997) uses the cross-state variation in
estate taxes in 1983 data to attempt to separate the two effects. He finds that the ma--inal
estate-tax rate has a significant effect on the probability and amount of the transfer.
25Note that the additional exclusion for family-owned businesses was not in effect at the
time at which these data were collected.110 McGarry
imprecisely, likely because of the small number of observations with non-
zero farm wealth. In neither equation isthere a significant change in the
estimated effects of the marginal tax rates with the inclusion of these
variables.26
4.3 Simulations
The equations estimated above provide a particularly useful framework for
analyzing the responsiveness of transfers to changes in the tax law. The
probit and OLS equations can be used separately to calculate the expected
change in the probabffity of a transfer and in the conditional amount, and
they can be combined to calculate an unconditional change in the amount
given. In the simulations that follow I first calculate the predicted probabil-
ity of making a transfer for each parent or parent couple andthen calculate
the expected amount conditional on a transfer being made.27 Using these
two values, the unconditional expectation is calculated as
E[t] =P(tk>0) . E[tkltk> 01 +P(tk =0) . 0
for each family in the sample. The average of these expectations gives
the average expected transfer over all individuals, and the sum yields
the total expected transfers for this population. I repeat this procedure
using the original estimates of the coefficients, but substitutingalterna-
tive values of the effective marginal tax rate.28
Under current law the lifetime exemption will gradually increase from
the $600,000 applicable when these data were collected to $1 million in
2006. A $1-million exemption would decrease the fractionof the sample
with taxable levels of assets from 4.1 to 1.6 percent, but would not
change the marginal rate for those still subject to tax. Becausethe major-
ity of the population does not face estate taxes evenwith the $600,000
limit, raising it to $1 million has no effect on their behavior. Tofocus on
those actually experiencing a change in the tax environment, I reportthe
simulated effects of the subsample with wealth above $600,000 per
The weakness of these results is not surprising. Data from 1992 decedents show that
only 1.1 percent of estates owing tax used the special valuation applicable tofamily farms
or business (Eller, 1996). It is therefore likely thatmuch of the effect of the compositional
variables is due to differences in the liquidity of assets.
Here I use the estimates from the equations without the compositional effects,although
the results are similar if the latter specification is used.
The marginal effect of a change in the tax rate r on the expected amount given canbe
calculated as
dE[tk] dE[tkltk > 0]aP(tk> 0)
P(tk> 0) . + . E[tkltk> 0].
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TABLE 6
Simulated Change in Transfers for Changes in Tax Policy
Decrease in transfers
relative to current status (%)
Tax policy Probability Amount(a)
$1-million exemption 0.9 12.3
$1.0-million exemption; 1.1 17.9
decrease in rates of 7.5
percentage points
No estate tax 1.6 27.8
Sample is singles with wealth> $600,000, couples with wealth> $1.2 million.
(a) Figure reported is the unconditional change, calculated from the change in the expected value E[t,j
P(tk> 0) .E[tkltk> 01 + P(tk0) . 0.
spouse. These results are presented in Table 6. When the exempt
amount is raised to $1 million, the probability of making a transfer falls
by only 0.9 percent, but the total amount of the expected transfer de-
creases by 12.3 percent. Thus, while wealthy parents are not likely to
stop transferring resources to their children in response to this change in
the tax structure, they are likely to reduce the amount they transfer.
The Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 calls for a gradual elimina-
tion of the estate and gift taxes by the year 2009. The phase-out of the tax
begins in 2001 and 2002 with reductions in the top marginal ratesto 50
percent. Tax rates (across the board) are then lowered further in each
year, beginning in 2003, for a total reduction of 7.5 percentage points by
the end of the phase-out period.29 These decreases in rates areaccompa-
nied by a gradual increase in the exempt amount to $1 million. When the
estate tax is eliminated entirely in 2009, there is a corresponding change
in the laws governing the capital gains treatment of bequests. Specifi-
cally, the step up in basis value that currently exists for assets transferred
as bequests wifi be eliminated for estates of more than $2 million be-
queathed to a nonspouse heir.3°
There are a number of possible simulations that these changes bring to
mind, I focus on two: First, I simulate the expected transfer behavior
given the tax environment in the final year before the estate tax is elimi-
nated. In this scenario, the exempt amount is $1 million and themar-
29This 7.5-percentage-point reduction for the wealthiest comes after the lowering of the
top marginal rates to 50 percent.
3° The elimination of the step up in basis is not immediate, butis phased in gradually for
estates valued between $1.3 million and $2 million. The spousal exemption for basis step
up is limited to $3 million. See United States Congress (1999a, 1999b) for further details.112McGarry
ginal rates are reduce by 7.5 percentage points, with the reductionfor
the top brackets coming after the lowering of rates to 50 percent.This
simulation provides an interesting comparison with the one above,
wherein the exempt amount is also $1 million, but the marginal tax rates
remain at their initial levels. Second, I simulate the effectof eliminating
all estate taxes.
With the $1-million exemption and the lower marginal tax rates, there is
a decrease of 1.1 percent in the averageprobability of making a transfer,
and a relatively large fall of 17.9 percent in the amounttransferred. Note
that the change in the reduction in transfer probabilities and amounts
from row 1 of table 6 is due to the lower tax rates faced bythose with
estates over $1 million. Thus, the reduction in rates hasonly a small effect
on the probability of a transfer,but a large effect on the amount given.
Assuming there is no estate tax, the change in the probabilityof a
transfer remains relatively small, equal to 1.6 percent, but theexpected
amount declines by a large amount, equal to 27.8 percent.
I emphasize that these simulations are based on the assumptionthat
the coefficients on the tax variables estimate the true effectsof the tax
and are not capturing additional nonlinear effects of wealth.If wealth
effects have biased these coefficient estimates, then the actualchanges in
giving associated with changes in the tax law wifi be smallerthan these
figures indicate.
An important goal of proposals to reduce or eliminate the estate taxis
to enable donors to transfer more resources totheir heirs. The results in
Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the short-term effect wifi be a reductionin
inter vivos giving. If the timing of the transfers is important tochildren,
and earlier is preferable to later, then this postponementof parental
giving may reduce the child's well-being. It is also unclear howmuch of
the tax savings wifi be passed along to children. In the absenceof an
estate tax, the parents' lifetime wealth is greater.Some of this increase in
wealth wifi translate into an increase in the amount bequeathed tochil-
dren, some will be used to increase the parents' own consumption,and
some may be used to increase charitable giving.
The effect on charitable giving is noteworthy. On the one hand, the
wealth effect increases charitable gifts, while on the other, eliminating
the estate tax eliminates the preferential tax treatment of charitablegifts
so that the prices of bequeathing tochildren and to charities are the
same. This increase in the relative priceof charitable bequests wifi de-
crease the fraction of the estatebequeathed to charitable institutions.
Evidence in the literature suggests that the net effect would be ade-
crease in charitable giving. However, notall research supports this view.
Early work by Barthold & Plotnick (1984) found no relationship betweenInter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?113
the rate of estate tax and charitable bequests. Furthermore, Auten and
Joulfaian (1996) estimate that elimination of an estate tax would also
reduce inter vivos charitable giving by individuals with children.
5. THE EXTENT OF GIVING
Much of the theoretical literature has focused on a comparison of the
benefits of making taxable inter vivos gifts relative to taxable bequests.
Little attempt has been made to estimate the extent to which wealthy
individuals are taking full advantage of the opportunities for tax-free
giving. If the wealthy are not using the $10,000 annual exclusion, a focus
on the merits of giving beyond this level seems unwarranted. The results
presented here indicate that individuals do respond to estate and gift
taxes by making more and larger inter vivos transfers to children, but
they have not addressed the question of whether the wealthy give to the
full extent predicted by a tax minimization strategy.
To examine this issue I limit the sample to the subset of wealthy
individuals (those with per-person wealth above $600,000) and calculate
the amount that could be given if each spouse (or single parent) gave
$10,000 to each of his children, grandchildren, and children-in-law. This
calculation provides a measure of the ability to reduce the size of the
estate in a single year through tax-free familial transfers.3' If multiplied
by the expected length of life, the total provides the expected amount
that could be given to children, free of any transfer taxes, over the
remainder of the parent's life.
The potential for yearly giving in this sample is surprisingly large. The
average number of children is 3.1, and the average number of grand-
children is 3432 Including children-in-law with these lineal descendants
results in an average potential number of familial beneficiaries of 9.1.
Allowing each spouse in a married couple to make a $10,000 gift, the
average potential tax-free transfer is $147,000 per year. Continued trans-
fers of this magnitude over the parent's expected life yields a total poten-
tial for tax-free inter vivos gifts of over $4 million on average, far more than
the average asset holdings of even this wealthy group. If the number of
potential recipients in each year, for each spouse, is limited to the children
of the respondent(s), the potential for yearly tax-free giving is $50,900,or
approximately $1.9 million over the lifetimes of these parents.
31The potential to give in each year can obviously be as large as the donor wishes, since
any recipient qualifies for a tax-free gift of $10,000. Furthermore, there is no limit on
transfers to a single recipient made specifically for schooling or health expenditures.
32J remind the reader that the initial selection process limited the sample to those with
children.114 McGarry
TABLE 7
Distribution of Gifts Relative to Exempt Amount
Giving greater than potential
Giving equal to potential
Giving less than potential








Potential is equal to $10,000 per recipient.
Sample is singles with wealth> $600,000, couples with wealth> 1.2 million.
Sample sizes differ across columns because of missing information on grandchildren.
How close to these figures do parents come? Are there many who are
giving above this limit as would be predicted by the intricacies of the tax
code? Table 7 shows the distribution of total giving relative to these tax
limits. Only 3.1 percent (2.4 + 0.7) of those with taxable levels of wealth
gave an amount greater than or equal to this potential,while 96.9 per-
cent gave less. Conditional on a positive transfer being made, 5.2 per-
cent gave an amount at or beyond the limit. If the potential to transfer
tax-free is measured with respect to children only, the proportion trans-
ferring an amount at least equal to the potential is 6.6 percent overall and
11.1 percent among the givers.33
The potential tax savings lost by this relatively low level of giving is
substantial. Poterba (2000a) estimates that planned giving in each year up
to the annual exclusion could reduce taxable wealth by 23 percent. Based
on his calculations, this level of giving implies ayearly flow of inter vivos
transfers of $235 billion. However, estimates made by Poterba and by
others (Gale and Scholz, 1994) indicate that the amount actually trans-
ferred is less than one-quarter as much, implying a substantial shortfall in
giving. Using the same survey, Page (1997) calculates that if parents
maximized their tax-free giving, no one in his sample would be faced with
paying estate taxes.
Additional evidence of this phenomenon comes from McGarry (2000).
Estimates in that paper show that by maximizing tax-free giving to chil-
If I ignore the potential for married couples to each make a transfer of $10,000, the
fraction of the sample transferring an amount greater than or equal to $10,000 per child
remains small at 9.4 percent.
Children only
Number of observations 424 247 416 252
3.8 6.3
2.8 4.8
93.4 88.9Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?115
dren, children-in-law, and grandchildren, parents in the HRS and
AHEAD could reduce the total tax bifi by 72 percent relative to the
amount owed with no giving. Projecting the actual giving observed in
the data over the remainder of the respondents' expected lives yieldsan
expected reduction in the tax bifi of just 20 percent.
Given the attention paid to estate planning in the popular press and
by the public, the frequency with which the wealthy elderly fail toex-
ploit this simple means of decreasing the size of their estates is surpris-
ing. There have been several explanations put forth for this lower than
expected level of giving, many of which are noted in Poterba (2000a).
First, it might be that elderly parents are risk-averse and are concerned
about outliving their assets. They do not want to give away too much
and end up with insufficient wealth should they live a long life. On a
related point, these parents may fear that substantial medical expenses
or the need for nursing-home care could deplete their resources. Poterba
suggests further that these wealthy elderly may believe they are more
capable investors than their children and seek to maintain control of
dynastic wealth for as long as possible. Likewise, they may receive util-
ity from holding wealth or from the respect or power it confers. Alterna-
tively, those who do not take advantage of tax-free giving could simply
misunderstand the full implications of the tax law, or could anticipate
changes in the law that would negate the need for inter vivos giving.
Although none of these explanations can be tested directly, there are
some correlates that one can use to investigate their likely relevance. In
Table 8 I examine differences in observable characteristics among those
in the wealthy subsample who make transfers equal to at least $10,000
per child ("limit-givers") and those who do not ("non-limit-givers").
Given the small sample sizes, useful multivariate analyses are not possi-
ble, and these simple differences in means across groups should be
interpreted with caution.
Consider first the suggestion that those who are transferring less than
the potential tax-free amount are doing so because they fear outliving
their assets. Table 8 shows that the limit-givers are somewhat older and
report a lower subjective survival probability than their counterparts,
consistent with their greater willingness to spend down assets.
Differences in insurance status support the notion that the threat of
future medical expenses might also be responsible for the observed be-
havior. Those making large transfers are more likely to have private
The subjective survival measures are responses to the questions:"... what is the proba-
bifity you wifi live to age 75?" (for the HRS) and the probability of living approximately 10
more years (AHEAD). Responses of spouses are averaged together for both this measure
and for age.TABLE 8
Differences by Transfer Behavior for Those with Taxable Estates
Gave at least $10,000 per child
Number of obs. when in 28 396
both surveys
Number of obs. when in 13 110
AHEAD only
Variables withare available for AHEAD families only; those with ', for HRS only. The numberof
observations therefore differs across variables.
Yes No
Mean Std. err. Mean Std. err.
Age 64.4 2.1 61.3 0.5
Probability of surviving to 75 0.65 0.05 0.71 0.01
(HRS)**
Probability of surviving 10
years (AHEAD)*
0.40 0.10 0.53 0.03
Either spouse in poor health 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.01
Private health insurance*
(those with Medicare)
0.70 0.11 0.59 0.04
Long-term care insurance* 0.43 0.15 0.25 0.05
Long-term care insurance 0.40 0.24 0.07 0.03
(HRS)**
Number of children 1.94 0.19 3.19 0.09
Average schooling of
children
15.5 0.32 14.6 0.09
Average income of children 51,355 5,843 41,485 958
Fraction of children with
more schooling than
parents
0.32 0.09 0.35 0.02
Fraction of children finan-
cially better off than
parents*
0.14 0.08 0.25 0.04
Have a financial advisor* 0.29 0.13 0.48 0.05
Transferred $5,000 or more
in past 10 years*
1.0 0.0 0.51 0.05
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health insurance to supplement Medicare (among those enrolled in
Medicare), and more likely to have long-term care insurance, both of
which reduce the probability of catastrophic medical bills, allowing indi-
viduals to more readily reduce assets. This explanation takes insurance
holdings as given. If instead if one views insurance holdings as an indica-
tor of risk aversion, then these differences suggest that the limit-givers
are more risk-averse. By purchasing insurance they have eliminated one
precautionary motive to save, but one would expect them to remain
hesitant to dispose of assets due to other uncertainties, contrary to what
would be predicted by their giving behavior.
It is obviously not possible using survey data to measure a child's
ability to invest wisely. However, it is worth noting that both the
average schooling and average income of children is marginally higher
among the limit-givers. Thus, on an absolute level, the children of
limit-givers are better off than those of non-limit-givers. Interestingly,
the reverse is true if one measures financial status relative to their par-
ents. On average, just 32 percent of the children of limit-givers have
more schooling than their parents, and only 14 percent are better off
financially. For the non-limit-givers these figures are 35 and 25 per-
cent.35 These differences in the relative economic well-being of children
are consistent with transfers being made, in part, out of a desire to
reduce inequalities within the family, rather than for tax considerations
alone.
It is unlikely that the wealthiest in the sample are completely unaware
of the tax consequences of their behavior. Having amassed a sizable
estate, one would imagine that they have a good deal of financial knowl-
edge, as well as access to expert opinions. In fact, while 29 percent of the
limit-givers have a financial planner, 48 percent of the non-limit-givers
do, suggesting that the non-limit-givers are not lacking information.
Finally, consider the possibility that not all parents desire to increase
transfers to their children. They may believe that even net of taxes, the
amount bequeathed wifi be large, and that additional transfers are better
spent by the government or charitable institutions. While attributing
differences in behavior to differences in tastes certainly begs the ques-
tion of the origin of these tastes, the empirical evidence indicates that
such differences are large. Among AHEAD respondents, all of the limit-
givers transferred $5000 or more to a child in the past 10 years, compared
to just one-half of the non-limit-givers. This information is not obtained
The variable measuring relative financial status is the response to a question in AHEAD
that asks parents to report if the child's "financial situation (is) better, about the same, or
worse than" theirs.118McGarry
in the HRS, but parents in that survey were asked about their views on
bequests. The survey asked whether leaving an inheritance was, "very
important, somewhat important, or not important." The distribution of
responses to this question also demonstrates a strongdifference in views
about giving. Sixty percent of the limit-givers thought it was very impor-
tant to leave an inheritance, compared to just 35 percent of the non-limit-
givers. At the other tail, less than 7 percent of the limit-givers viewed
leaving an inheritance as unimportant, while 18 percent of the non-limit-
givers did. These differences in past giving and in the importance of
leaving an inheritance could be an indicator of substantial heterogeneity
in the desire to give to children.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The decision to make inter vivos transfers is complex. Such transfers
depend strongly on parental income and wealth and on the resources
of the children (McGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 1997). Transfers also depend
on the likely tax status of the estate (Poterba, 2000a, b; McGarry,2000)
and, as demonstrated here, on the marginal tax rate itself. Transfers are
more common among those with taxable wealth and are made inlarger
amounts. Furthermore, both the probability and expected amount of
transfers vary positively with the marginal tax rate. Changes in estate
taxes, operating through changes in the lifetime exemption and in the tax
rates themselves, have a strong effect on the transfer behavior of the
wealthy. In simulations, eliminating the estate tax results in a decrease of
nearly 30 percent in expected transfers to children among those initially
subject to tax.
While the literature has focused on the role of taxable inter vivos trans-
fers as a mechanism to reduce estate and gift taxes, the evidence pre-
sented here suggests that not only do the wealthy fail to make inter vivos
gifts above the tax-free limits, but they also forgo many opportunities to
reduce the tax owed by the estate by costlessly transferring $10,000 per
year to children; 90 percent of wealthy parents transferless than this
amount. Although several explanations have been offered for this lack of
giving, we are only beginning to assess their validity, and certainly
additional investigation is needed.
Finally, inter vivos transfers are also relatively frequent among those
unlikely to face estate taxation. In the sample used in this paper, 30
percent of parents with wealth below the taxable limits made transfers to
their children in the past year, suggesting that there are important mo-
tives for transferring resources beyond those due to tax planning. Thus,
while one should conclude that estate and gift taxes likely play an impor-Inter Vivos Transfers or Bequests?119
tant role in altering the transfer behavior of the wealthy, the decision
process is sufficiently complex that numerous other factors also affect
this behavior.
APPENDIX
The means and standard errors of the variables used in the analysis are
given in Table 9.
TABLE 9
Means of Variables Used in Analysis
(a) The number of observations differs for some variables due to missing values.
Mean Std. err.
Financial variables
Bequeathable wealth 261,530 4,550
Log of positive values 11.05 0.027
Income (respondent and spouse) 32,929 423
Log of positive values 9.62 0.019
Fraction of wealth in home (overall) 0.148 0.004
Fraction of wealth in business (overall) 0.058 0.024
Fraction of wealth in farm (overall) 0.019 0.001
Fraction of wealth in stock (overall) 0.055 0.012
Marginal tax rates
Full sample 0.02 0.001
Conditional on positive tax 0.41 0.002
Demographic variables
Life expectancy 29.2 0.15
Married 0.58 0.005
Nonwhite 0.16 0.003
Number of children 3.29 0.012
Average age of children 37.4 0.11
Average income of children 37,040 195
Transfer behavior
Transfer to at least one child 0.32 0.004
Total amount of transfers (over positive
values)
5,608 241
Number of observations(a) 11,754120 McGarry
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